If Nigeria were a settled democracy, where elections are determined strictly by public sentiment and the numerical weight of votes, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu would probably be staring at a difficult re-election battle in 2027. Three years into his administration, economic hardship has deepened across the country.
Inflation has remained stubbornly high, the naira has lost significant value, food prices have soared beyond the reach of millions, and insecurity continues to haunt several parts of the federation. Public frustration is visible in marketplaces, social media discourse, labour protests and increasingly within the political class itself.
Ordinarily, such conditions would significantly weaken the chances of any incumbent seeking another term. But Nigeria’s electoral history has often shown that presidential contests are not decided by public mood alone.
Elite consensus, regional bargaining, coalition arithmetic, institutional influence and opposition cohesion often play even bigger roles than mass discontent.
And it is precisely within this context that observers say Tinubu may yet find a viable pathway to retain power in 2027 despite mounting odds.
The opposition, which initially appeared to be converging around a broad coalition capable of mounting a formidable challenge against the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), is now splintering into multiple camps. What began as an ambitious effort to unite anti-Tinubu forces has gradually degenerated into familiar battles of ambition, regional calculations and leadership ego.
Today, instead of a united opposition front, Nigeria appears headed toward a three-way or even four-way opposition fragmentation involving the African Democratic Congress (ADC), the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), the Allied Peoples Movement (APM), and remnants of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
Internal Cracks
For Tinubu and the APC, this fragmentation could become the decisive factor that secures another four years in power. The first major crack within the opposition coalition emerged around the issue of zoning and presidential ambition.
Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who remains one of the most influential opposition politicians in the North, reportedly insisted on contesting the presidency under the ADC platform despite growing agitation from southern and Middle Belt groups that power should remain in the South until 2031 in line with Nigeria’s unwritten rotational arrangement.
Atiku’s insistence created immediate tension within the coalition, particularly among supporters of Peter Obi, the former Labour Party presidential candidate, whose popularity among youths and urban voters remains substantial.
For Obi’s supporters, another northern candidacy after Muhammadu Buhari’s eight years in office would amount to undermining the principle of power rotation. For Atiku’s camp, however, political viability and electoral strength mattered more than zoning sentiment.
The disagreement quickly escalated into a full-blown political rupture.
Confronted with the possibility of losing the ADC presidential ticket to Atiku, Obi and his loyalists exited the coalition and found a new political home in the NDC, a rapidly emerging opposition platform that has since become the focal point of a fresh political realignment.
The NDC has moved swiftly to establish itself as a serious national platform ahead of the 2027 election.
In what many observers interpret as a direct response to the zoning controversy within the ADC, the party formally zoned its presidential ticket to the South and adopted a political understanding that any southern candidate elected under its platform would serve a single four-year term before handing power back to the North in 2031.
That arrangement appears specifically designed to accommodate both southern agitation for continued power retention and northern political interests represented by figures, such as former Kano governor, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso.
Kwankwaso’s decision to align with Obi within the NDC has become one of the most consequential developments in Nigeria’s opposition politics.
North, South Rotation
The former Kano governor, who retains substantial grassroots influence through the Kwankwasiyya movement, openly declared his willingness to serve as running mate to Obi if the party settles for a southern presidential candidate.
Speaking during an interview on Arise Television’s Prime Time programme, Kwankwaso said both leaders had agreed to work together to tackle insecurity and rebuild national stability.
“Both of us, my humble self and Peter Obi, have agreed to tackle the issue of insecurity head-on to ensure there is peace and stability in this country,” he said.
Asked whether he would accept the vice-presidential slot under Obi, Kwankwaso responded without hesitation.
“If the party decides that I should be the running mate of any candidate from the south under the circumstances, I’d be happy to work together with him.”
Political observers believe an Obi-Kwankwaso ticket could significantly alter the electoral equation in 2027 by combining Obi’s strong urban and youth appeal with Kwankwaso’s formidable northern grassroots machinery.
The alliance is already generating momentum within opposition circles.
Dr. Yunusa Tanko, an NDC chieftain, disclosed on Saturday that leaders of the Obidient Movement and the Kwankwasiyya Movement had held a strategic convergence meeting aimed at strengthening collaboration within the party.
“The Aspirant Summit of the Obidient Movement and Kwankwasiyya Movement converged today to meet the aspirant, with both movements agreeing to synergise and strengthen collaboration in the NDC. Nigeria will be OK,” Tanko said.
Beyond the high-profile alliance talks, the NDC has also embarked on aggressive institutional consolidation.
The party recently announced the commencement of sales of expression of interest and nomination forms for aspirants ahead of the 2027 elections. According to the timetable released by its leadership, presidential primaries are scheduled to hold on May 29, 2026, in Abuja.
In what appears to be an attempt to project itself as a reform-oriented platform, the NDC also announced significant discounts on nomination fees for women, youths and persons living with disabilities.
Incentive Package
The party’s National Secretary, Ikenna Morgan Enekweizu, said the move was aimed at reducing the influence of money politics and expanding democratic participation.
“The fact that someone is young and may not be a money bag or is disadvantaged by some physical disabilities should not shut him or her from contributing their quota to nation-building,” Enekweizu said.
The NDC’s growing visibility has also triggered a wave of defections from rival parties.
Former APC National Youth Leader, Sadiq Abubakar, recently defected to the party and declared his intention to contest the Gombe governorship election under its platform.
In Benue State, a major political realignment also occurred after several ADC gubernatorial and legislative aspirants collapsed their structures into the NDC under the leadership of Dr. Raymond Edoh.
The defectors cited the party’s inclusiveness and humanitarian-driven leadership style as major attractions.
“We have decided to join forces with Dr. Raymond Edoh because he represents the kind of leadership Benue State truly needs at this critical time,” Sunday Atah, one of the defectors, stated.
Yet, even as the NDC gathers momentum, the broader opposition landscape continues to fracture.
More Factions
Another major opposition bloc is emerging around the Allied Peoples Movement (APM), driven largely by Oyo State Gov. Seyi Makinde and Bauchi State Gov. Bala Mohammed. Makinde’s recent declaration of presidential ambition under the APM platform has further complicated opposition calculations.
At a massive rally held at Mapo Hall in Ibadan, the Oyo governor formally unveiled his ambition while urging opposition forces to unite against the APC.
“I have no doubt about my ability to occupy the highest office and deliver transformative governance for all Nigerians,” Makinde declared before supporters.
The rally, widely seen as a demonstration of his political dominance in Oyo State, also served as a strategic move to consolidate opposition influence in the South-West.
Makinde argued that the nation required a significant leadership shift and blamed internal disputes within the PDP for his decision to explore alternative political arrangements.
However, his entry into the presidential race has effectively widened the opposition field instead of unifying it.
Political analysts note that although Makinde may lack the nationwide political machinery to seriously threaten Tinubu’s dominance, his candidacy could still split opposition votes, especially in parts of the South-West and among segments of the PDP base.
The PDP itself has descended into one of the deepest internal crises in its history. The faction led by Kabiru Turaki recently announced an alliance with the APM following an opposition summit held in Ibadan. But hopes that the Turaki faction might align with the NDC now appear uncertain following Makinde’s presidential declaration.
Comrade Ini Ememobong, spokesperson for the Turaki-led PDP faction, confirmed that additional alliances were still under consideration, but declined to provide clarity on possible collaboration with the NDC.
Meanwhile, the rival PDP faction backed by Federal Capital Territory Minister Nyesom Wike and led by Abdulrahman Mohammed remains the faction officially recognised by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
That faction has largely aligned itself with Tinubu’s administration.
Although the Wike-backed PDP recently screened Sandy Onor as its sole presidential aspirant alongside governorship hopefuls from 17 states, many analysts view the exercise as largely symbolic given Wike’s open support for Tinubu’s re-election.
The consequence of all these developments is increasingly clear.
Instead of facing a single coordinated opposition coalition, Tinubu may confront at least three major opposition candidates in 2027 – Atiku under the ADC, Obi under the NDC, and Makinde under the APM.
Self Destruct policy
That fragmentation could fundamentally reshape the electoral arithmetic in the president’s favour.
Ironically, Tinubu enters the 2027 race carrying significant political baggage, especially in Northern Nigeria, which delivered over 63 percent of his votes in 2023.
Many northern political stakeholders now complain of marginalisation within his administration, citing what they perceive as excessive concentration of power within a narrow South-West political circle.
One of the most forceful articulations of this grievance came from United States-based Nigerian professor and columnist, Farooq A. Kperogi, in a widely discussed article titled “Tinubu’s Baffling Northern Exclusion Strategy.”
Kperogi argued that Tinubu’s governing style has alienated the very northern establishment that helped secure his victory in 2023.
“Since becoming president, Tinubu has governed as if only the Southwest voted him into power, or as if the 25.9 percent of the votes he got from there is more significant than the 63.6 percent he got from the North,” Kperogi wrote.
He further argued that Tinubu had failed to transcend what he described as “Lagos-centric and Yoruba provincialism.”
“I have pointed out in several past columns that Tinubu hasn’t been able to transcend his Lagos-centric and Yoruba provincialism. That’s why he still rules as if he were the governor of Lagos and not the president of Nigeria,” he stated.
Kperogi also pointed to the perceived marginalisation of Vice President Kashim Shettima and the appointment of retired Major General Adeyinka Famadewa as Special Adviser on Home Security as developments fuelling northern suspicions.
“It used to be said that the only truly powerful and influential northerner in Tinubu’s administration was National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu,” he wrote.
“But with the duplicative appointment of retired Major General Adeyinka Famadewa… there is a widespread feeling in the North that Tinubu has finally purged the last vestige of northern influence in his government.”
The professor warned that Tinubu appeared to be pursuing a politically risky electoral strategy by alienating Northern Nigeria without constructing an alternative national coalition robust enough to compensate for those losses.
“To dispense with a region that gave you more than 60 percent of your vote, you need several emblematic motions,” he argued.
Kperogi also maintained that Obi’s growing popularity among southern minorities and sections of the Christian North could further complicate Tinubu’s calculations.
“Most of the Southeast won’t warm up to him in 2027 both because of his systematic exclusion of the region and because of the region’s enthusiastic embrace of its son, Peter Obi,” he wrote.
Opposition Vulnerability
Yet despite these vulnerabilities, Tinubu may still benefit from the fragmented nature of the opposition battlefield.
The president’s strategists understand that Nigerian presidential elections are rarely won through overwhelming national popularity alone. Victory often emerges from regional vote splitting, institutional advantage, coalition management and the ability to secure pluralities in critical states.
And with Atiku, Obi and possibly Makinde sharing opposition votes across different regions, Tinubu could find enough electoral openings to remain competitive even amid widespread public dissatisfaction.
Atiku is expected to dominate substantial portions of the core North, but his weak political foothold in much of Southern Nigeria remains a major handicap.
Obi, on the other hand, could significantly improve his northern performance through an alliance with Kwankwaso while retaining his traditional strength in the South-East and urban southern centres.
But Obi’s candidacy may also split southern and Middle Belt anti-Tinubu votes that might otherwise have coalesced behind a single opposition figure.
In the South-South and parts of the Christian Middle Belt, analysts already foresee a complex scenario where the political elite align with Tinubu while grassroots sympathy tilts toward Obi.
The result could be another fractured electoral map rather than a unified anti-incumbent wave.
Makinde’s candidacy, though not considered nationally dominant, could still siphon critical votes away from both Atiku and Obi, particularly within sections of the PDP structure and the South-West opposition base.
In effect, the very forces that should ordinarily combine to threaten Tinubu’s hold on power may ultimately neutralise one another.
For many political observers, the unfolding opposition fragmentation bears uncomfortable resemblance to previous elections in Nigeria where incumbents survived less because of overwhelming popularity and more because their challengers failed to unite around a single platform.
The lesson of 2015, when the opposition successfully rallied behind Muhammadu Buhari under the APC, still looms large in the nation’s political memory. Buhari’s victory over then President Goodluck Jonathan was possible largely because major opposition blocs collapsed their ambitions into one coalition.
That formula appears absent today.
Instead, Nigeria’s opposition space is drifting toward multiple centres of power, each driven by separate ambitions, regional calculations and competing ideological narratives.